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Abstract
Many macroscopic physical processes are known to occur in a time-directed way despite the
apparent time-symmetry of the known fundamental laws. A popular explanation is to postulate
an unimaginably atypical state for the early universe — a ‘Past Hypothesis’ (PH) — that seeds
the time-asymmetry from which all others follow. I will argue that such a PH faces serious
new difficulties. First I strengthen the grounds for existing criticism by providing a systematic
analytic framework for assessing the status of the PH. I outline three broad categories of criticism
that put into question a list of essential requirements of the proposal. The resulting analysis
paints a grim picture for the prospects of providing an adequate formulation for an explicit PH.
I then provide a new argument that substantively extends this criticism by showing that any
time-independent measure on the space of models of the universe must necessarily break one
of its gauge symmetries. The PH then faces a new dilemma: reject a gauge symmetry of the
universe and introduce a distinction without difference or reject the time-independence of the
measure and lose explanatory power.
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1 Introduction
Everyday processes occur in such a way as to suggest an obvious intuitive difference between the
past and the future. One of the great mysteries of physics and, in particular, the metaphysics of time
is to explain the existence of this time-asymmetry despite the symmetry of the known microscopic
theories of physics under an appropriate time reversal operation. Ludwig Boltzmann provided a
proposal for such an explanation that seems to work for everyday processes.1 This proposal placed
the burden of explanation not on the nature of the fundamental laws but on the nature of the initial
state. The time-symmetry of the laws is then broken by the asymmetrical restriction to possible
models that have highly atypical initial (but not final) states. In this way, Boltzmann attempted
to explain why one might readily expect a cup of coffee to fall and shatter onto the ground but
would not expect a mess of coffee and shards of cup to reassemble themselves. Because the cup of
coffee is a highly unusual state in the space of possible ways that the constituents of the cup and
coffee could be arranged, it is more typical to see the pieces scatter haphazardly than to see then
reassemble as a cup of coffee.
While this kind of explanation works reasonably well for simple thermodynamic systems, com-
plications arise when attempting to apply this strategy to the universe as a whole. Evidence from
modern cosmology that the earliest known states of the universe appear to have extremely low
entropy seems to have improved the situation. Positing an unimaginably atypical past state for the
entire universe, a so-called Past Hypothesis (PH) (Albert 2009), might then be used to iteratively
provide an explanation for why nested subsystems of the universe — such as a coffee cup in a room
in a city on a planet etc — should individually be expected to start off in atypical states. Early ver-
sions of the PH date back to Boltzmann himself (2012) and comprehensive improvements making
use of modern lessons from cosmology have been advanced mostly notably by Roger Penrose (1979;
1994), Joel Lebowitz (1993), Shelly Goldstein (2001; 2004) and Huw Price (1997, 2002, 2004). A
well-known formulation has been advocated in Albert (2009) where the phrase ‘Past Hypothesis’
was coined after an initial proposal by Richard Feynman (2017, p.116).
The status of the PH remains controversial: it is not difficult to find both glowing appraisals
and scathing criticism. Barry Loewer rates the problem of time-asymmetry as “among the most
important questions in the metaphysics of science” (Loewer 2012) and the PH as “the most promis-
ing approach to reductive accounts of time’s arrows”. Huw Price rates the discovery of the low
entropy past “one of the most important [achievements] in the entire history of physics”(2004).
Despite these grand claims, criticism abounds. John Earman (2006) puts it bluntly:
This dogma, I contend, is ill-motivated and ill-defined, and its implementation consists
mainly in furious hand waving and wishful thinking. In short, it is (to borrow a phrase
from Pauli) not even false.
Schiffrin and Wald (2012) deliver a scathing critique of the basic technical premises of the idea
identifying “a number of serious difficulties in” attempting to formulate concrete implementations
of the proposal.
The purpose of this paper is to asses and extend existing criticism and introduce a particularly
troubling dilemma in order to argue that the PH faces disturbing new difficulties. First we will
provide a comprehensive analysis of existing criticism of the PH for the purpose of assessing its
status. Three broad categories of criticism are identified and listed at the beginning of §3. These
categories provide a formal scheme for describing and evaluating different criticisms of the PH that
have been advanced in the literature. To add precision to this process, we will start in §2 by giving
1. See Uffink (2017).
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a modern presentation of the arguments motivating the PH and identify a list of important condi-
tions (in §2.3) that underly these arguments. We will then analyze several examples of criticism,
taken as exemplars, in each category by identifying the specific conditions that each criticism puts
into question. While this list of criticisms is not meant to be exhaustive and no single form of
criticism should be seen as providing grounds to reject the entire proposal, when taken together
these objections are sufficient to raise serious concerns regarding the PH. The resulting analysis
already paints a rather grim picture for the prospects of formulating a PH in an unambiguous way
using sound mathematical and physical principles.
One common response to such objections is that they amount merely to an unreasonable in-
sistence on technical rigour given the immense mathematical difficulties associated with defining
measures in general relativity. In response to such objections, we show in §4 that the PH encounters
a troubling dilemma that persists even if all such technical concerns are removed. This dilemma
is an uncomfortable choice between a loss of explanatory power — the first horn (see §4.2) — and
the breaking of a gauge symmetry — the second horn (see §4.3).
To establish this dilemma, we begin by using the analysis of §2 and 3 to describe the first
horn. In §2 we show that it is essential to the arguments of the PH to provide a justification
for the measure used in the required typicality argument. Then in §3 and §4.2 we argue that
the existence of a unique time-independent measure on the cosmological state space is essential to
the explanatory claims of the PH. In §4.1 we show that the unique time-independent measure is
not invariant under a particular cosmological symmetry called dynamical similarity. Using this,
we establish the second horn of the dilemma in §4.3 by arguing that a failure of the measure
to be invariant under this symmetry introduces a distinction without difference by over-counting
empirically indistinguishable states. This leads to the following dilemma: either reject a time-
independent measure and undermine the explanatory basis for the PH (horn 1) or introduce a
distinction without difference by breaking dynamical similarity (horn 2).
2 The Past Hypothesis
In this section we will first provide a modern outline of Boltzmann-style explanations of time-
asymmetry, §2.1, and then use this framework to illustrate the basic logic of the Past Hypothesis,
§2.2. We compile a list (§2.3) of conditions necessary for the arguments of the PH collected from
§2.2.
2.1 Boltzmannian explanations of time-asymmetry
In the Boltzmannian reasoning, the ultimate goal is to explain within a given system the time-
asymmetry of some macroscopic processes from the fundamentally time-symmetric microscopic
processes that underly it. The main formal ingredients of this procedure therefore involve a spec-
ification of the macro- and micro-states of the system, a particular reductive map between them,
and a way to describe their behavior. This is usually achieved in the context of the Hamiltonian
formalism. In this formalism, the micro-states of the systems in question are given in terms of
representations of the configurations of the microscopic constituents of the system and their states
of motion. These are expressed as generalized position and momentum variables formally repre-
sented by a symplectic manifold, Γ, that specifies the phase space of the system. A phase space
of this kind has a number of interesting mathematical properties. Of central importance is the
existence of a privileged measure, called the Liouville measure µL(Σ), that can be used to assign
weights to arbitrary regions Σ ∈ Γ. The Liouville measure is singled-out by its rather remarkable
symmetry properties that will be discussed in detail below. Concretely, the Liouville measure is
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the integral over the nth power of the symplectic form, where n is half the dimension of Γ. In
Darboux coordinates (qi, pi) where {qi, pj} = δij , we have µL(Σ) =
∫
Σ
∏n
i=1 dpi dqi (i.e., µL is the
Lebesgue measure on Γ in these coordinates). For systems with infinite degrees of freedom or where
the range of positions and momenta is infinite, there may be mathematical difficulties in precisely
formulating this measure. The first set of relevant conditions for applying the Boltzmannian logic
is therefore that there exists some way of writing a mathematically precise (Condition-A1) and
empirically unambiguous (Condition-A2) measure µ on Γ. (Note that this does not necessarily
have to be the Liouville measure.)
With a suitable measure in hand one can assign weights to arbitrary regions in phase space.
These weights can be taken to define different notions of typicality for these regions. For example,
one can say that a particular region A is typical on phase space if its weight as determined by µ is
sufficiently large with respect to the weight of phase space itself:
µ(Γ)− µ(A)
µ(Γ)
 1 . (1)
In general, a set S is said to be typical with respect to some property P and measure µ if its weight
according to µ is large as compared with all other sets that possess the property P (Frigg 2009).
Clearly, any notion of typicality requires some interpretation for the weights provided by µ in order
to have any meaning. For the purposes of Boltzmann’s argument, we will see below that it will be
necessary to interpret the weight µ(Σ) as the relative likelihood of finding the system in a particular
region Σ (as opposed to somewhere else in Γ) at any given time. We identify this as an additional
requirement (Condition-B) of the formalism.
The next formal step is to define the macro-states of a system. Physically these correspond to
macroscopic states of the system such as temperature, volume, pressure, etc. Formally they are
represented by some macro-state space M which must have a (much) smaller dimension than Γ.
Because Boltzmann was usually considering closed systems where the total energy E is preserved,
it is customary to consider states restricted to constant energy surfaces ΓE = Γ|E=constant (i.e., the
micro-canonical ensemble). In general many microscopic states will be indistinguishable from each
other at the macroscopic level. This indistinguishability is modeled as a projection from ΓE to M .
The micro-states identified under this projection define a partitioning of ΓE into the partitions Γm,
where m ∈M ranges over all macro-states in M . These partitions represent equivalence classes of
macroscopically indistinguishable micro-states. In order for these to be meaningful physically, there
must exist some epistemologically motivated coarse-graining procedure that realizes this projection.
For example, if the macroscopic variable in question is the temperature, then the temperature must
be a well-defined quantity. We identify this requirement with a further condition (Condition-C).
With these ingredients in hand it is now possible to define the Boltzmann entropy (from now on
called the ‘entropy’ unless otherwise stated) of a particular macro-state m as the logarithm of the
Liouville weight of the partition Γm:
2
SB = kB log[µL(Γm)] . (2)
The last formal ingredient describes the behavior of the system. Consider representing a single
history of the system by a curve γ in Γ as in Fig 1. The dynamics of an entire region can then be
understood in terms of a collection of curves or a flow where each point in the region is mapped
to another neighboring point on Γ. For systems where the energy is conserved, this flow can be
expressed mathematically in terms of a single phase space function, H, called the Hamiltonian
of the system. A theorem of primary importance due to Liouville (1838) shows that the flow
2. kB fixes the units of SB.
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Figure 1: A small, atypical initial state will typically spend most of its future in a large equilibrium
state Γeq.
generated by any choice of Hamiltonian function is guaranteed to preserve the Liouville measure.
An immediate caveat of this theorem is that, up to a constant, the Liouville measure is the unique
(smooth) measure preserved by any choice of Hamiltonian.3 It is this property that mathematically
privileges the Liouville measure. Liouville’s theorem is therefore doubly important for Boltzmann’s
reasoning. It provides at the same time a possible justification, via uniqueness, for the choice of
typicality measure µ and a consistency requirement, via the invariance property under evolution,
for being able to use the same measure at different times. The latter point arises as a consequence
of a stronger requirement, which we identify as Condition-A3, that the typicality measure be
invariant under all gauge symmetries of the system (in this case time-translational and, crucially,
time-reversal invariance). In this context and for the remainder of the paper, we will understand a
‘gauge-symmetry’ to be a transformation of the representations of a system that relates physically
indistinguishable states.
We are now equipped to give a modern synthesis of Boltzmann’s reasoning. First one must
show that for the system in question there exists an exceptionally large macro-state Γeq that takes
up most of the phase space volume of the system. We take this to represent a further requirement
that Γeq be a typical state in ΓE (Condition-D). The relevance of Condition-D can be seen by the
interpretation given to the weights of µ given Condition-B. If µ(Γeq) gives the relative likelihood
of finding the system in µ(Γeq) then for all practical purposes Γeq is a steady or equilibrium state
of the system because the system will almost always be found there. More significantly, if an
equilibrium state exists, then a system that starts in a small macro-state will typically spend most
of its future time in Γeq. The basic picture is depicted in Fig 1. This picture is plausible because the
counting suggested by the required interpretation of µ immediately suggests that a system starting
outside of Γeq has little option but to quickly wander into Γeq, where it will remain for a very long
time. But now there is a puzzle. Applying the same reasoning backwards in time suggests that
3. Proof: Formally Liouville’s theorem implies LχHµ = 0 , ∀H : Γ 7→ R where µ = ωn and ω is the symplectic
2-form on Γ and the vector field χH is determined via dH = ιχHω. Writing an arbitrary smooth volume-form as
v = fµ, where f is some arbitrary smooth positive function f : Γ 7→ R+, then Liouville’s theorem and the condition
LχH v = 0 immediately lead to f = constant.
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a state finding itself in a small macro-state will also typically spend of all its past in equilibrium.
Because this apparently violates our knowledge that the past entropy of the universe was low, we
are faced with the so-called second problem of Boltzmann (see Brown and Uffink (2001)). To solve
this problem, one can posit an extremely atypical condition on the earliest relevant state of the
system. Under this condition, the system will typically find that it will approach the equilibrium
state in the future. Note the temporal significance of the measure (Condition-B) and its central
role in grounding the explanation of time asymmetry.
2.2 The Past Hypothesis
The main idea behind the PH is to evoke the Boltzmann-style reasoning of the previous section
to explain time asymmetry in the universe. The system in question is then taken to be the en-
tire universe and the PH itself translates into a special condition on the earliest relevant state
of the universe. All of the mathematical quantities discussed above — phase spaces, measures,
macro-states, etc — are then taken to represent aspects of the universe as a whole. The proposed
explanation is given in terms of a typicality argument: universes that obey the appropriate PH, it
is claimed, will typically evolve towards an equilibrium state in the future. Time-asymmetry arises
by asymmetrically applying the special condition to past, rather than future, states. That the
Boltzmann reasoning, whose empirical success is traditionally realised in closed sub-systems of the
universe, can provide explanatory leverage when applied to the universe as a whole is then taken
as a further condition (Condition-E) for the PH. Empirical support for the extreme atypicality of
the initial state of our universe is taken to be implied by abundant cosmological evidence for a
low-entropy early universe (e.g., the near-thermality of the Cosmic Microwave Background (CMB)
power spectrum). We take this to be a final condition (Condition-F) for the viability of the PH.
2.3 Requirements of the Past Hypothesis
We will now state all conditions identified in §2.1 (this list of conditions is not intended to be
sufficient for the PH).
(A) There exists a measure, µuniverse, on the phase space of the universe, Γuniverse, that is simulta-
neously:
(A1) mathematically precise,
(A2) empirically unambiguous, and
(A3) invariant under all gauge symmetries.
(B) It is justifiable to interpret the weights given by the chosen measure in terms of the relative
likelihood of the system being in a given region at a given time.
(C) There is an epistemologically meaningful and mathematically well-defined projection from the
microscopic phase space of the universe, Γuniverse, to a macroscopic phase space, Muniverse.
(D) There exists a unique and exceptionally large state, defined to be the equilibrium state Γeq,
that is a typical macro-state on the phase space of the universe at any given energy E; i.e.,
µuniverse[ΓE,universe]− µuniverse[Γeq]
µuniverse[ΓE,universe]
 1 .
(E) Typicality arguments have explanatory power when applied to the universe.
(F) There is cosmological evidence for the PH being true.
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3 Criticisms of the PH
In this section we will set the stage for the arguments motivating the considerations of §4. We
identify and describe three categories of criticisms of the PH:
(I) Mathematical precision. These criticisms question whether the formal quantities necessary
for stating the PH can be given precise, unambiguous mathematical definitions.
(II) Dynamical considerations. These criticisms grant (I) but question whether the resulting
formal quantities have the physical characteristics required for a Boltzmannian explanation
— especially when gravitational interactions are taken into account.
(III) Justification and explanation. These criticisms grant both (I) and (II) but question the
explanatory power and physical justification of the typicality arguments used when applied
to the universe as a whole.
Division of criticism into the above categories emphasizes the reliance of the latter forms of criticism
on being able to provide adequate responses to the former. If, for example, one cannot meet the
standards of Category-I, then the framework must be rejected and the considerations of Categories
II and III become irrelevant. We will see below that there are already significant worries raised
at the level of Categories I and II even though a significant amount of philosophical literature is
focused on evaluating criticism falling into Category-III. We now discuss several examples, taken
to be exemplars, of criticism to illustrate each of the above categories. This analysis will help
illustrate the importance of the distinct properties of the Liouville measure that provided the basis
for the dilemma presented in §4.3.
3.1 Category I: mathematical precision
In this section we will primarily be concerned with issues arising from Conditions-A due to infinite
phase spaces. Such phase spaces entail serious mathematical problems for measure-theoretic ap-
proaches to explanation. These problems stem from two distinct sources. The first arises because
measures evaluated on an infinite interval can only be defined according to a limiting procedure
that typically leads to physically significant regularization ambiguities. These problems are com-
pounded in field theories because of a second source of ambiguity due to the phase space itself being
infinite dimensional. In this case, it is a theorem that no Borel measure exists (Curiel 2015) so
that the system must be truncated to a finite phase space in order to accommodate any measure.
Ambiguities of these two kinds lead to a tension between mathematical precision (Condition-A1)
and empirical uniqueness (Condition-A2). To make matters worse, the purely mathematical prob-
lem of defining any measure on the phase space of general relativity invariant under all space-time
symmetries is far from being solved. This open technical problem is in fact one of the main for-
mal obstructions to obtaining a canonical formulation of quantum gravity. With this in mind, it
is advisable to explore various approximations to general relativity that render the computations
of measures more tractable. But even in this simplified setting, one encounters immediate and
troubling difficulties that are emblematic of the more general case.
Pioneering work in Gibbons, Hawking, and Stewart (1987) that was elaborated on by several
authors in both the physics (Hawking and Page 1988; Hollands and Wald 2002; Corichi and Karami
2011; Ashtekar and Sloan 2011; Schiffrin and Wald 2012) and philosophy literature (Earman 2006;
Frigg 2009; Curiel 2015) shows that the natural measure on homogeneous and isotropic cosmologies
has infinite phase space volume. In the references listed, different schemes are provided for handling
these divergences, and these schemes introduce ambiguities. A particular illustration of this will
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be outlined in detail in §4.1. To resolve these mathematical ambiguities (of the first kind discussed
above), new inputs, which are often physical in nature, must be introduced. It is thus paramount
that the extra inputs needed to resolve these ambiguities neither conflict with other symmetry
principles, in accordance with Condition-A3, nor implicitly assume what is trying to be explained:
i.e., the time-asymmetry of local thermodynamic processes. Otherwise, the explanatory power of
the PH is undermined.
To illustrate the extent to which these ambiguities are problematic, consider the concrete results
of different authors with different intuitions performing computations of the relative likelihood
of cosmic inflation. Advocates for inflation (Kofman, Linde, and Mukhanov 2002; Carroll and
Tam 2010) proposed a measure according to which the probability of inflation was found to be
infinitesimally close to 1. Inflation skeptics (Gibbons and Turok 2008) proposed an alternative
measure where the probability of inflation was found to be 1 part in 1085! This remarkably huge
discrepancy reflects the extent to which individual beliefs can affect cosmologist’s determinations
of the appropriate physical principles used to justify their measure and the difficulties of resolving
the tensions between Condition-A1 and Condition-A2. Any conclusions drawn on the basis of a
typicality argument must be assessed in light of such remarkable disagreement between cosmologists.
Ambiguities of this kind are not improved when more realistic models including cosmological in-
homogeneities are considered. Any preliminary hopes, such as those alluded to in Callender (2010),
that adding an infinite number of degrees of freedom would help resolve these ambiguities can be
seen to be in vain when explicit models are considered. This has been done, for example, in Schiffrin
and Wald (2012). What was found there was that the additional degrees of freedom introduce cor-
responding regularization ambiguities of the second kind discussed above. It is therefore necessary
to introduce new physical principles in order to resolve these ambiguities. Given the daunting
nature of a full general relativistic treatment, these considerations raises serious doubts regarding
the possibility of being able to attribute any meaningful notion of typicality to the universe.
3.2 Category II: dynamical considerations
In this section we will consider the unique properties of gravitational dynamics that complicate
our entropic intuitions for the universe, assuming that a well-defined truncation of the phase-
space exists on which a Liouville measure can be defined. Consider the equilibrium state of a
free gas. It is smooth, homogeneous and nothing like the current state of the universe, which is
characteristically clumpy and uneven. Those clumps comprise, amongst other things, star systems
— one of which supports the far-from-equilibrium biological system we find ourselves in. On the
other hand, analysis of CMB temperature fluctuations reveals only a small 10−5 deviation from
homogeneity. How can these observations be compatible with a low entropy past state? The
standard response to this is that the gravitational contribution to the entropy should dominate at
late times because of the unusual thermodynamic character of the gravitational interactions. This
contribution is so great that it more than compensates for the decrease in entropy observed through
the clumping of matter. Intuition for this comes from entropic considerations in Newtonian N -body
self-gravitating systems, which have been used to model, for example, the dynamics of dust and
stars in galaxies and galaxy clusters. But even in this simplified and well-tested setting there are
difficulties that are emblematic of the considerations of §3.1.
Because Liouville volume is a volume on phase space, the inverse square potential due to gravity
and the large momenta it can generate flip expectations for what constitutes a high and low entropy
state. The steep gravitational potential well taps a vast reservoir of entropy allowing for the kind
of sizable low entropy fluctuations we see in biological systems on Earth. These features as well as
the difficulties they entail are reviewed nicely in Padmanabhan (2008, 1990), which gives detailed
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proofs of many of the results referenced below. This flipping of expectations is argued to occur not
only for N -body systems, but also in a full-fledged general relativistic treatment of entropy. Thus,
advocates of the PH (for example Goldstein and Lebowitz (2004) and Albert (2009)) emphasize
the N -body intuition pump as providing an explanation for why the early homogeneous state
of the CMB should be thought of as having low entropy and the current clumped state, which
contains steadily accumulating stable records, as having high entropy. Moreover, this intuition
was a primary motivation for early attempts at formulating an explicit PH such as Penrose’s Weyl
Curvature Hypothesis (1979).
The N -body intuition pump, however, also raises potential concerns. Firstly, if we follow the
past state far enough into the early universe, a full general relativistic treatment becomes unavoid-
able. But as we have already seen in §3.1, such a treatment suffers from troubling ambiguities and it
is not clear that the simple Newtonian intuition will remain valid. Another significant worry is the
definition of equilibrium itself. The notion of equilibrium in gravitational systems is complicated by
two sources of divergence (for details see Padmanabhan (2008)): i) the infinite forces particles exert
upon each other when they collide, and ii) the infinite distances particles can obtain when ejected
from a system. To cure these divergences, it is necessary to render the entropy finite by imposing
additional constraints. This involves closing the system at some maximum size, so that particles are
not allowed to escape, and forbidding two particles from being able to collide. This requires extra
assumptions that must be grounded in physically acceptable principles. It is therefore paramount
that these physical idealizations be well-motivated. But the fact that these idealizations break
down under specified conditions implies difficulties in defining stable equilibrium for the system.
Indeed, N -body systems are known to only have local — but no global — maxima (Padmanabhan
2008). Thus, gravitating systems do not have genuine equilibrium states, and Condition-D cannot
be strictly satisfied. In absence of an equilibrium state, thermodynamic quantities such as macro-
states and their entropy cannot be defined and Condition-C is strictly violated. While this is not
problematic for local meta-stable systems like a galaxy, it can certainly be problematic for globally
defined systems like the entire universe. Moreover, even when local equilibria exist, there is still no
guarantee that gravitational dynamics will actually steer the system towards these local equilibria
in order to satisfy Condition-B. The crucial role of dynamics in the Boltzmannian argument has
been emphasized in Frigg (2009) and Brown and Uffink (2001).
3.3 Category III: justification and explanation
This section will firstly be concerned with the essential need to satisfy Condition-B by finding a valid
justification for using Liouville volume as a typicality measure, assuming all concerns of Category I
and II have been resolved. In conventional statistical mechanical systems, this justification proceeds
along two traditional routes. The first and oldest route relies on a theorem by Birkhoff (1931) that
states that for ergodic systems the average time spent in a particular phase space region becomes
roughly proportional to its Liouville volume if the timescales in question are much longer than the
Poincare´ recurrence time. Unfortunately, for almost all system — and certainly for the universe —
the Poincare´ recurrence time is significantly longer than the estimated time since the Big Bang. The
second route, usually favored for its practicality, is to argue that the system undergoes a process
called mixing. Roughly speaking, a system is mixed when the long-run evolution of the measure of a
system becomes approximately homogeneous, and therefore Liouvillian. Many systems exhibit this
property and the relevant mixing timescales can be computed explicitly. Unfortunately, Schiffrin
and Wald (2012) argue that the observed expansion of the universe is too rapid to allow the large
scale structures of the universe to interact often enough for mixing to occur on these scales. This
suggests that it is unreasonable to expect the universe as a whole to undergo mixing. It would seem
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that in terms of conventional justification schemes for the Liouville measure Condition-B cannot
be made compatible with the observational requirements of Condition-F.
It is possible to look for justification schemes satisfying Condition-B that do not originate from
conventional statistical mechanical considerations. One proposal made by Penrose (1979; 1994)
and later advocated (either implicitly or explicitly) by Goldstein (2001), Lebowitz (1993), and
Albert (2009) is a version of the Principle of Insufficient Reason (PIR) as formalized by Laplace. In
Penrose’s version, a blind Creator must choose initial conditions for the universe among the space of
all possibilities. Being indifferent to which conditions to choose, the Creator assigns equal likelihood
to each possibility according to the Liouville measure. Given the failure of standard justifications
schemes, Schiffrin and Wald (2012) point to Penrose’s proposal as the only available alternative.
Unfortunately, the PIR has a troubled history in the philosophy of science and suffers from several
well-known difficulties. At least four prominent criticisms are identified in Uffink (1995). While
some of these are addressed implicitly throughout this text, one line of criticism dating back to
Bernoulli is noteworthy because it also directly puts into question the validity of Condition-C.
In this line of criticism one derives paradoxes that originate in an incompatibility between the
measures obtained when applying the PIR to different choices of partition for the micro-states
of a system. These paradoxes occur when the partitions correspond to disjunct coarse-grainings
or refinements of each other (Norton 2008). There is nothing in the PIR that tells you which
partitioning of the micro-states is the “correct” one precisely because this would require some
non-trivial knowledge about how these partitions may have been gerrymandered. Without direct
knowledge of the “correct” partitioning of micro-states, the PIR loses all explanatory power.
The only remaining justification for the Liouville measure is a uniqueness argument under
time-symmetry. If one requires a time-symmetric measure, then the uniqueness of the Liouville
measure under the requirement of being preserved by arbitrary Hamiltonian evolution does single
it out. However, as we will see in §4, very general symmetry considerations will put into doubt
any motivations for using the Liouville measure to establish a notion of typicality for models in the
universe.
We end this section by mentioning a prominent dialectic between Price (2002, 2004) and Callen-
der (2004a, 2004b) on the explanatory power of the PH that questions the validity of Condition-E.
In this dialectic Price argues that the PH itself should require explanation in pain of applying a
“temporal double standard” to a past state when an atypical future state would plainly require
explanation. Callender responds by stating that contingencies rarely (or never) require explanation,
and an initial condition such as a PH is a contingency of this kind.
4 A Dilemma for the Past Hypothesis
4.1 Preliminaries: dynamical similarity as a gauge symmetry of the universe
Before establishing the horns of the dilemma, it will be convenient to state some results that will
be central to the analysis. We will need to give the definition of a particular symmetry of the
universe and list some of its core properties. The symmetry that will be central to our argument
is called dynamical similarity. The three aspects of dynamical similarity that will be needed for
our analysis are: first that dynamical similarity is a gauge symmetry of any general relativistic
formulation of the laws of the universe, second that the Liouville measure is not invariant under
dynamical similarity and third that in known theories of the universe dynamically similar measures
are badly time-asymmetric. To illustrate our first point, we must show that dynamical similarity
relates empirically indistinguishable descriptions of a general relativistic system. We will do this
first by making a general argument and then by showing that this general argument is consistent
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with the treatment of particular cosmological theories.
We begin by giving a definition of dynamical similarity.4 Consider any system whose dynamical
possibilities are specified by Hamilton’s principle. For such systems, an action functional S[γ] is
given such that the Dynamically Possible Models (DPMs), γDPM, of the system are stationary
points of S:
δS[γ]|γDPM = 0 . (3)
Then any transformation on the state space of such a system that rescales the action functional,
S → cS , (4)
is defined to be a dynamical similarity. For any system of this kind, a dynamical similarity will
map a DPM to another DPM, and is therefore a symmetry. This follows straightforwardly from the
fact that the stationarity condition (3) is invariant under (4). Dynamical similarities are therefore
symmetries of any general relativistic description of the universe because general relativity can be
formulated in terms of Hamilton’s principle.
This notion of symmetry, namely a transformation that maps DPMs to DPMs, is not yet enough
for our argument. We will further need to show that dynamically similar DPMs are empirically
indistinguishable. To see that this is true, observe that the constant in the transformation (4) can
always be set to 1 by a suitable choice of units for the action. Since the unit of action is the unit of
angular momentum, we find that dynamical similarities map DPMs to DPMs with different choices
of units of angular momentum. Only if these choices can be compared with an external reference
scale for angular momentum can the DPMs in question be empirically distinguished. If instead
the units of angular momentum are referenced from within the system, then an arbitrary choice
of units can have no empirical consequences. Because we are interested in a general relativistic
description of the entire universe, there can be no external reference unit to distinguish between
dynamically similar descriptions of the system. Thus, dynamical similarities are symmetries of a
general relativistic description of the universe that relate empirically indistinguishable models; i.e.,
they are gauge symmetries.
This point is well-appreciated by cosmologists. In writing down the equations of cosmological
systems, one starts with a general relativistic formulation and then imposes spatial homogeneity
and isotropy. The simplest models of inflation can thus be described by a single geometric variable
v(t) representing the volume of a co-moving patch of the universe and a single massive scale field
φ(t). The Hamiltonian for this system can be written as:
H =
[
−H2 + pi
2
φ
v2
+ m˜2φ2
]
, (5)
where H is Hubble red-shift parameter conjugate of v, piφ is the momentum of the scalar field, and
m˜ is a dimensionless mass.5
This theory inherits a dynamical similarity from its underlying general relativistic description.
If we remember that S =
∫
dt
(
v˙H + φ˙piφ −H
)
then the transformation
v → cv φ→ φ (6)
H → H piφ → cpiφ ,
4. For an excellent account of dynamical similarity and its role in defining measures in cosmology see Sloan (2018).
5. To obtain this expression we have absorbed all units of angular momentum into the variables v, piφ and t.
Thus, H and φ are dimensionless. We have also used a time parameter t = vτ , where τ is the proper time along a
homogeneous slice.
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is a dynamical similarity when t→ ct. The physical significance of the dynamical similarity (6) is
straightforward to understand. It represents the freedom to arbitrarily choose the initial volume of
a fixed fiducial cell while keeping the red-shift fixed. In cosmology, dynamical similarity therefore
reflects the well-known property that the scale factor is an unobservable degree of freedom even
though its momentum, the Hubble parameter, is observable. This achieves our first objective.
Our second objective is to show that the Liouville measure is not invariant under dynamical
similarity. This together with the previous result will be essential for establishing the second horn
of the dilemma: the breaking of gauge invariance by the Liouville measure. This can be achieved
by expanding upon the mismatch between the transformation properties of the volume v and its
conjugate momentum H. The Liouville measure is a homogeneous measure on phase space. This
means that it gives the same weight to a configuration variable as it does to the corresponding
momentum. It is thus impossible for any of measure of this kind to be invariant under a symmetry
that acts in an unbalanced way on the phase space variables. We can illustrate this explicitly for
the cosmological theory given above. A set of canonically conjugate variables for this theory is:
{v,H, φ, piφ}, and therefore the Liouville measure is
µL(R) =
∫
R
dv dH dφ dpiφ . (7)
This measure is explicitly not invariant under the symmetry (6). While illustrative and physically
relevant, the non-invariance of the Liouville measure in this example is not just a special feature
of this particular cosmological theory, but a general property of the Liouville measure. In order
for a dynamical similarity to rescale the action as in (4) it must rescale the symplectic potential
θ = pdq → cθ. But since the Liouville measure is just a power of the exterior derivative of the
symplectic potential, µL(R) =
∫
R (dθ)
n, the Liouville measure itself will necessarily rescale under a
dynamical similarity. Thus, the Liouville measure in general cannot be invariant under dynamical
similarity.
The last objective of this section is to show that the lack of invariance of the Liouville measure
results in a significant numerical time-asymmetry in its projection onto the dynamically similar
state space relevant to cosmological theories. This result will be useful in strengthening the case
for the loss of explanatory power that leads to the first horn of the dilemma (see §4.2 for details).
To achieve the last objective, we will recall the results of well-known derivations.6 The measure
that is relevant to our considerations is a measure not on the space of states but on the space of
models. This can be achieved by projecting the Liouville measure onto some initial data surface on
phase space. Because the Liouville measure is time-independent, the choice of initial data surface is
arbitrary. For the cosmological theory presented in this section, a convenient choice of initial data
surface that is also empirically meaningful is that of a surface of constant red-shift: H = H?. This
choice leads to the Gibbons–Hawking–Stewart measure (Gibbons, Hawking, and Stewart 1987)
µGHS(r) =
∫
r
√
(H?)2 − m˜2φ2dv dφ , (8)
where r is a region on the surface H = H? that is compact in φ but not in v. This measure
is not regarded to be physical in part because of its non-compact domain in terms of v but,
more importantly, because of the arbitrariness of the value of v in terms of a choice of initial
fiducial cell. More recently, Sloan (2019) has established a direct link between this arbitrariness
and dynamical similarity.7 To obtain a physically significant measure, Hawking and Page (1988)
6. For a summary of the results used here see Schiffrin and Wald (2012).
7. The connection was first noticed in the context of Loop Quantum Cosmology by Corichi and Karami (2011)
and Ashtekar and Sloan (2011).
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defined a regularization procedure that takes advantage of the homogeneity of (8) in v to integrate
over all possible values of v. The resulting measure
Prob(rφ) = lim
vmax→∞
∫ vmax
0 dv∫ vmax
0 dv
∫
rφ
dφ
√
(H?)2 − m˜2φ2∫
rφmax
dφ
√
(H?)2 − m˜2φ2 → finite (9)
is finite. The result depends only on the ratio of the integrals over the region rφ, which can
be used to define inflation, and the finite region rφmax , which is given in terms of the dynamical
constraints of the theory. From the perspective of dynamical similarity, the integration over v
is motivated by requiring that the physical measure be invariant under symmetries that relate
physically indistinguishable models. The integral over v is an integration over the action of the
dynamical similarity (6). The physical measure (9) is therefore invariant under (6) while the
unphysical measure (8) is not.
The integration over v creates a new problem. The physical measure (9) depends explicitly
on the choice of initial data surface as determined by the choice of initial red-shift factor H?.
This dependence on H? is significant. As was shown explicitly in Schiffrin and Wald (2012), the
different choices of H? used by inflation sceptics (Gibbons and Turok 2008) compared with inflations
advocates (Kofman, Linde, and Mukhanov 2002; Carroll and Tam 2010) leads to a colossal 85 order
of magnitude difference between the estimates of the likelihood of inflation. Because a choice of
H? corresponds to a choice of initial time, this huge numerical imbalance leads to a significant
temporal asymmetry: choosing a more recent value of H? gives a dramatically smaller value for
the weight of the same region rφ.
This result is not just a special feature of the particular cosmological theory developed in this
section. The Liouville measure is the unique time-independent measure on phase space. But,
as we have shown, the Liouville measure is in general not invariant under dynamical similarity.
There is therefore no (smooth) time-independent measure invariant under dynamical similarity.
This means, in general, that a dynamically similar measure on the space of models will necessary
depend on the choice of initial data surface (e.g., it will depend on H?). Moreover, the temporal
asymmetry introduced by this is significant. For the theory introduced in this section, it leads
to an 85 order of magnitude difference between different choices of H?. There are good reasons
to believe that this numerical imbalance will persist in any general relativitistic description of the
universe. The interpretation of dynamical similarity in terms of an arbitrary choice of volume will
persist in general relativity. In this context, the red-shift factor H is still the variable conjugate to
v. The temporal asymmetry will then always depend on the initial choice of H?, and this varies
wildly between now and the empirically accessible past in a monotonic way. The huge monotonic
variation of the Hubble parameter over the known history of the universe therefore introduces a
significant time asymmetry into the definition of a dynamically similar measure.
4.2 The first horn: loss of explanatory power
The analysis of §3 has established that there are many concerns regarding the justification of the
choice of typicality measure used to formulate a PH. In §3.2 it was argued that self-gravitating
systems have unusual thermodynamic properties and in §3.3 these arguments where combined with
known facts about the universe to suggest that conventional statistical mechanical justifications fail
when applied to the universe. Justifications that rely on indifference principles where also criticised
on epistemological grounds. The analysis of §3 therefore leads to the conclusion that the only
tenable justification for choosing the Liouville measure is an argument from time-independence.
The Liouville measure is indeed singled out as being the unique measure on phase space that
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is preserved by an arbitrary choice of dynamics. At first sight this uniqueness appears to be
particularly convenient because a time-independent measure is very natural in the context of a
PH. But time-independence in the measure is more than a question of convenience in the context
of a PH. In fact, it is an essential ingredient for the PH independent of any other justificatory
considerations.
Following Price (2002), the logic of the PH presented in §2.1 constitutes a contrastive expla-
nation of the form: if A then B rather than C. The explanans A — i.e., the PH itself — is taken
to explain the explanandum B — i.e., the fact that typical processes are seen to overwhelmingly
occur in a time-asymmetric way. The outcome C is then a typical member of a contrast class of
outcomes that would be likely if not for A. The explanatory power of A comes from increasing
the likelihood of B relative to C. In the case of a PH, the contrast class is the set of worlds where
typical processes overwhelmingly occur in a time-symmetric way. According to this logic, in order
for the PH to be a good explanation of time-asymmetry, it must be the only significant source of
time-asymmetry. Clearly this is consistent with the apparent time-symmetry of the form of the
fundamental laws. This consistency however is not sufficient. When a time-asymmetric measure is
introduced into the formalism, the time-asymmetry of the measure could itself provide an explana-
tion for the time-asymmetry of typical processes. This is especially true if the time-asymmetry of
the measure introduces a significant numerical temporal gradient as was shown in the previous sec-
tion for the case of cosmological models. Moreover, the time-dependence of the measure introduces
an ambiguity in terms of which instant should be used in order to obtain a measure on the space
of models. Such an ambiguity can only be resolved by including some additional principle to the
PH — thus undermining much of its explanatory appeal. It is therefore essential to the logic of the
PH that the measure employed be time-independent, and especially important that the measure
not be badly time-asymmetric. Otherwise we would have no reason to believe that processes would
not occur in a time-asymmetric way even if the PH were not true. Note that these considerations
hold regardless of any other justificatory considerations regarding the measure. This establishes
the first horn of the dilemma.
4.3 The second horn: violation of a gauge symmetry
In the preliminary §4.1 we saw that the projection of the Liouville measure onto the space of
models, while time-independent, is nevertheless considered by cosmologists to be unphysical. Con-
trastingly, the measure that is considered by cosmologists to be physical was found to be invariant
under dynamical similarity. We will now argue that this result is to be expected in any general
relativistic description of the universe. To do this, we will show that a measure that is not invariant
under symmetries that relate physically indistinguishable descriptions of a system (Condition-A3)
introduces two distinct problems: first it introduces a distinction without difference and, second,
it runs against standard practice in particle and statistic physics physics.
Consider a region R that lives in the domain D(µ) of some measure µ and a transformation
T : D(µ)→ D(µ) that maps this domain onto itself. Our assumptions demand that T map states
of a system to empirically indistinguishable states. The set of states in the region R is therefore
empirically indistinguishable from the set of states in the transformed region R′ = T (R). In
general, the non-invariance of µ under T implies that the weight of the transformed region is not
necessarily equal to the weight of the original: µ(R) 6= µ(R′). But if this is true then the weights
µ(R) and µ(R′) provide a distinction at the representational level between the regions R and R′.
Given our original assumptions, this distinction cannot represent any empirical difference. In this
sense, the measure µ therefore introduces a representational distinction that can’t be captured by
the empirical properties of the world. It is therefore not a valid measure for describing empirical
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phenomena.
This argument is reinforced by standard practice in particle and statistical physics that requires
that physical measures be invariant under all the gauge symmetries of a system. In the standard
model of particle physics the gauge-invariance of the path-integral measure is a central foundational
principle of the theory. More generally, the Faddeev–Popov determinant, which enforces the gauge-
invariance of the path-integral measure, is considered a necessary ingredient in gauge theory (see
Weinberg (2013, Chap 15) for an overview and defence of this standard practice). Similarly in
statistical physics, Jaynes (1973) has argued influentially that measures should be invariant under
transformations that relate indistinguishable states of a system. We therefore conclude that there
are strong epistemological and methodological motivations for requiring Condition-A3.
We are now in a position to state the second horn of our dilemma. As we have shown in the
previous section, dynamical similarity is a symmetry that maps states of any general relativistic
description of the universe to indistinguishable states. Given the argument above, any measure
not invariant under such a symmetry must violate a gauge symmetry and introduce a distinction
without difference. Therefore, a measure on the state space of a generally relativistic description of
the universe that is not dynamically similar will run into the symmetry-violating horn. But as was
shown in §4.1, the Liouville measure is not dynamically similar. It follows that use of the Liouville
measure therefore violates a gauge symmetry of the theory. This is the second horn.
We now recall the first horn of the dilemma. The formulation of the PH must make use
of the unique time-independent Liouville measure in order to retain its explanatory power. But
the Liouville measure is not dynamically similar, and therefore introduces a distinction without
difference. An advocate of the PH must therefore face the dilemma stated in the introduction:
either lose explanatory power or introduce a distinction without difference.
5 Discussions/Conclusions
We have seen that Boltzmann-style explanations of time-asymmetry that make use of a PH depend
upon a series of very restrictive conditions. Our analysis in §3 has uncovered several good reasons
to question whether these conditions can ever be simultaneously satisfied. Broadly speaking we
found that the nature of the phase space, dynamics and symmetries of general relativity provide
reasons for pessimism regarding the prospects for providing and justifying a satisfactory notion of
typicality for models of the universe. A common response against critiques of this kind is to observer
that strict insistence on mathematical rigour has often been unreasonable in the development of
theoretical physics. Controversy over difficult technical problems such as defining a measure on the
solution space of general relativity should not, it is argued, halt progress altogether. It should still
be reasonable to advance conjectures regarding the plausible features of measures that may one
day become available.
While such a strategy — effective or not — is available in response to much of the analysis
of §3, it is no longer available in response to the dilemma of §4. This is because the dilemma
is the result of a simple symmetry argument applied to a very general way of formulating the
laws of the universe. To reject dynamical similarity is to reject a description of the physics of
the universe in terms of Hamilton’s principle. To reject the uniqueness arguments for the time-
symmetry of Liouville’s measure is to reject a description of the universe in terms of a phase space.
To not require the gauge-invariance of the measure is to introduce a distinction without difference
and to reject standard practice in particle and statistical physics. None of these escape routes is
particularly appealing. Even if one grants all the technical assumptions required by the PH, the
dilemma persists. On the other hand, a rejection of the PH as an explanation for time-asymmetry
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avoids the dilemma completely. But how then is one to explain the time-asymmetry of macroscopic
processes given the apparent time-symmetry of the fundamental laws? In other words, how is one
to solve the original problem of the arrow of time?
One possibility would be to embrace the necessary time-dependence of the measure implied by
dynamically similarity. While the equations of motion of general relativity, and in particular the
cosmological models discussed in §4.1, are formally invariant under time-reversal, they also contain
redundancy under dynamical similarity. The construction of a time-asymmetric measure invariant
under dynamical similarity can be constructed for a very general class of systems (Sloan 2018)
in a way that mirrors the derivation of the physical measure (9). The resulting time-asymmetry
of the measure can be shown to result from the non-conservative, time-irreversible structure of
the reduced Hamiltonian for the system. Perhaps then the apparent time-symmetry of general
relativity is simply an artefact of a representational redundancy? But if time-asymmetry really is
built into the character of the empirically relevant formulation of the law, then this could provide
a new basis for providing an explanation for the arrow of time. Such a strategy would parallel
and further develop the approach suggested in Barbour, Koslowski, and Mercati (2014), which
also makes use of dynamical similarity. An important aspect of this approach is an account of
the low-entropy past state as a generic, rather than highly atypical, feature of the theory. Such a
scenario would therefore not require any PH. What remains is to extend a program of this kind to
general relativity and to show that the time-asymmetry of the reduced system is indeed sufficient
for explaining the observed time-asymmetry of macroscopic processes. This possibility opens up
new and exciting directions for future investigations.
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